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ABSTRACT
State-contingent Overconfidence:
Application to Bank Loans
by
CHAN Sze Nam
Master of Philosophy
Overconfidence (arrogance or overestimation of one’s ability) has often been viewed in
the finance literature as a character trait that is stable over time. This paper, however,
provides a first attempt to show that overconfidence can be state-contingent, that is, the
level of overconfidence among overconfident individuals could be influenced by an
external shock such as a financial crisis and a change in regulation, for example, the
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Both our experimental (based on psychological
approach on over-precision) and empirical results using more than 4500 manager-year
observations through controlling different personal and firm characteristics show that
individual self-confidence can be manipulated in psychological experiment and
managerial overconfidence can be state-contingent. We apply our results to the credit
market and show that since overconfident managers are excessive risk-takers, creditors
could be offering inefficient amounts of bank loans to business firms in the absence of the
knowledge about state-contingent overconfidence. However, during financial crisis and
under stricter regulation, overconfident managers are still opportunity seekers that they
would still look for profitable investment or else they would have exercised their options.
Our results show that the firms under the control remaining overconfidence chief company
officers during financial crisis and after implementation of SOX would have a significant
larger loan amount than the others.
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STATE-CONTINGENT OVERCONFIDENCE:
APPLICATION TO BANK LOANS
1. INTRODUCTION
The finance literature often assumed managerial overconfidence to be trait-based.
That is, if a manager is overconfident, he or she will remain overconfident all the time
(Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh 2012; Voon, Lin and Ma 2019). To the best of my knowledge,
state-contingent overconfidence and its applications have not been covered in the previous
literature. In this paper, using both experimental and empirical data, however, I find that
this may not be true. I believe that overconfidence can also be stated-based, that is, the
level of overconfidence can be changed by the state of the environment or the sentiment
of the economy. For example, the overconfidence level of an overconfident manager may
be lower in the presence of a financial crisis. While it is possible that a change in
environmental state may not always alter the overconfidence personality trait of the
manager (i.e. an overconfident manager might still remain overconfident), his or her level
of overconfidence and hence the appetite for risk would have been weakened by an
external shock.

The literature often compares which type of manager is more overconfident than the
other. For example, Lee, Hwang and Chen (2017) find that founder CEOs of large
companies is more overconfident than their non-founder counterparts, and male
executives are more overconfident than female executives (Huang and Kisgen 2013). The
literature also separates the chief executive officers (CEOs) into two dichotomous groups
(overconfident group and non-overconfident group) using option-based measures
(Malmendier and Tate 2005). The purpose of the dichotomous grouping is to compare the
1

investment or managerial behavior between overconfident and non-overconfident groups
of managers (Ahmed and Duellman 2013; Christensen, Nikolaev, and WittenbergMoerman 2016; Malmendier, Tate and Yan 2011) and to examine how firm factors may
affect the risk behavior between the overconfident and non-overconfident groups (see
Humphery-Jenner et al. 2015). The potential change in confidence level within each
dichotomous or homogenous group, however, has been ignored. Yet, as shown in this
paper, the degree of overconfidence and the extent of investment or risk-taking behavior
could differ among the overconfident CEOs. In our empirical analysis, in contrast to using
the dichotomous dummies, continuous overconfidence measures are constructed that
allow the overconfidence level to change among overconfidence CEOs. In addition to
firm’s fixed effects, CEO fixed effects in our models are adopted, as opposed to the
literature. Our analysis shows that overconfident managers can become more (or less)
overconfident in response to unprecedented shocks.

Managerial overconfidence is defined as the deliberate delay of top executives vested
with option compensations in exercising their in-the-money options. Using this definition,
once a manager fails to exercise his option when the option price rises over 67% of the
exercise price, he is identified as overconfident. Conversely, if a manager sold his option
when the option price reaches the 67% threshold of the exercise price, he is defined as not
overconfident. The overconfidence levels of an overconfident manager are represented by
the different overconfidence levels which are consistently above the 67% threshold (e.g.
above 67%; above 100%; etc.).

In this paper, a laboratory experiment is conducted to explore if individual’s selfconfidence is state-contingent, that is, whether one’s confidence level (encompassing
2

overconfidence level of an overconfident individual as well as non-overconfidence level
of a non-overconfident individual) is significantly affected by an external stimulus, after
controlling for trait-based confidence. The experimental approach, however, only
measures the change in confidence level of an individual rather than the change in
confidence level of a business manager in the real world. Therefore, the actual market data
is used to examine if managerial confidence level changes with external environmental
conditions. For example, this paper explores if an external shock such as a financial crisis
(for example the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC)) or a change in financial regulation
(such as Sarbanes Oxley Acts (SOX)) would change the confidence level of the managers.
Being exogenous shocks, both GFC and SOX can be used as natural experiments to detect
the presence of the state-contingent effect. Moreover, GFC and SOX enable us to apply
the state-contingent overconfidence concept to finance, specifically on how it can affect
the credit market.

Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda (2015) found that SOX implemented in
2002 served to restrain or weaken the controlling power of an overconfident CEO in
making decisions for his/her firm. In the presence of SOX, the accounting regulation is
tightened as the independent directors and auditors are empowered to circumvent or even
take over the investment decisions made by the overconfident CEOs. That is, the
independent directors/auditors were assumed to take over some of the management roles
of the CEO. Contrary to the previous studies, this paper tests if SOX would lower the
confidence level of CEOs rather than simply restraining the power of overconfident CEO.
With lower level of control to the companies, CEOs are expected to lose some of the overestimation and the overconfidence level may decrease.

3

To achieve this, an interaction term between SOX and confidence level is created. It
is hypothesized that managerial confidence level would change in the presence of SOX,
and the SOX-initiated decrease in the level of CEO confidence (implied by the
significance of the interaction term) would then alter a loan contract term offered to
borrowers in response to the potential decrease in default risk. In the case of GFC,
managerial confidence level is hypothesized to be reduced by the onslaught of the
unprecedented shock, and the significance condition of the interaction term (between
managerial confidence and GFC) that impacts on the loan term would reveal if managerial
confidence is state-contingent or not. This constitutes a natural experiment to provide the
potential evidence as well as the effect of state-contingent overconfidence.

To provide a practical application of the state-contingent overconfidence proposition,
we use firm data pertaining to the credit market. For instance, we examine if statecontingent overconfidence affects the bank loan amounts. Our analysis can be used to
inform creditors that the use of loan contract terms (such as loan size offered to borrowers)
should also depend inter alia on the state of the environment. The rationale for this is that
loan default risk seems to increase with managerial confidence simply because more
confident managers invest more and engage in more risky activities than less confident
managers (Voon, Lin and Ma 2019). Lenders may therefore need to adjust the loan term
of the borrower since his risk appetite could be altered by the change in the environmental
state. Lenders who resort merely to the trait-based assumption may not be able to adjust
their default risk optimally. For example, with the onslaught of a crisis, and in the absence
of the knowledge of the state-contingent confidence effect, banks would tend to reduce
the loan size in response to the systemic risk wrought by the crisis. However, cognizant
of the fact that managerial confidence level and hence the default risk level could be
4

lowered accordingly by the GFC, banks should not in practice reduce the loan size by as
much. In the absence of the knowledge on state-contingent confidence, there could be an
over-reduction of bank loans, which would be detrimental to the growth of the firms and
the profitability of the financial institutions. Our paper alerts creditors to this potential
inefficiency effect.

5

2. Theories
2.1 Overconfidence

Psychologists found that there are three distinctions of overconfidence, namely overestimation, over-placement and over-precision. Over-estimation emphasizes on the
people’s feelings on their performance, abilities, level of control and success rate. For
example, students may over-estimate the test score (Clayson 2005). Over-placement refers
the judgment of your own performance when comparing to the others. Usually, the
analysts being interviewed may not be the most outstanding ones, but they will show their
confidence and they will regard themselves as the top tier analysts during the conversation.
Over-precision reflects the confidence of people knowing the truth or reality. To sum up,
it reveals that the overconfidence is a result of emotional illusion, cognitive bias and social
factors. External environment is one of the considerations to affect the self-confidence
level as reflected from classic studies in psychology that negative experiences could have
stronger effects on human behavior. (Anderson 1965; Peeters and Czapinski 1990;
Skowronski and Carlston 1989). Therefore, overconfidence is hypothesized to be
responsive to external shocks. In psychological studies, observants’ confidence levels are
usually being manipulated and statistically significant differences are found that
confidence level of people changed during the experiment. Therefore, a psychology
experiment is adopted in the paper showing the validity of the research.

2.2 Psychological experiment setting

To conduct a laboratory experiment to provide a state-contingent evidence of a
change in the individual level of confidence, with the help of my supervisor and his
6

colleague, we asked two different classes of students (44 from a psychology class and 38
from an economic class) to complete a survey/questionnaire powered by the Qualtrics
Survey System. We explore if individual’s confidence level can be generally and
significantly changed by an external stimulus which is artificially manipulated.
Participants are first approached to complete a questionnaire measuring their personality
traits, which include their various personality trait variables such as dispositional
optimism, narcissism, internal economic locus of control and positive mood. Participants’
performance in these trait-based measures will be used as the control for the experiment.
Participants’ trait-based confidence level will be measured by a 10-item Interval
Production Task, following Langnickel and Zeisberger (2016). Past literature suggests that
optimism (Williams [1992]), narcissism (Macenczak, et al. 2016), and positive mood
(Ifcher and Zarghamee 2014) could be positively correlated with individual confidence.
The 6-item Life Orientation Test-Revised, as in Scheier, Carver, and Bridges (1994), will
be used to measure participants’ general dispositional optimism. The 13-item version of
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Gentile et al. 2013) will be used to measure
participants’ narcissistic tendency. Participants’ mood will be assessed by 20-item Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988).

2.3 Design of questionnaire

The whole questionnaire consists of three types of questions: interval production task
(Russo & Schoemaker 1992), scale (Langnickel and Zeisberger, 2016; Hilton et al., 2011)
and decision making (Biais et al., 2005). The whole questionnaire is divided into two parts.
The first part will survey the students on their personal traits. This part will measure their
dispositional optimism, trait narcissism, economic locus of control (scale), mood, future
7

orientation and delay discounting. The second part will try to manipulate the
overconfidence level of the participants. Students are required to handle the interval
production task (State) which can manipulate the level of confidence in over-precision
which measures how much the candidate knows the truth.

Adopting Maki (1998) approach, the questionnaire relies on a simple procedure to
manipulate participants’ confidence in estimates, through a way to give a false expectation
of task difficulty. One of the examples is Ülkümen et al., (2008). In their paper, they try
to analyse the effect of ease of estimation and the confidence on budget estimates. In their
study, participants in the low (high) confidence condition are informed that most of the
students finished the task before, were quite inaccurate (accurate) in estimating the budget.

Secondly, the paper also prepares another approach: false feedback. It is an approach
to assign participants into two groups. One group will be assigned with the overconfident
condition and another with accurate condition. The group of participants assigned to
overconfident condition will receive overly positive feedback on their performance and
another group assigned to the accurate condition will receive accurate feedback.
Following Anderson et al. (2012), they used person personality perception tests in which
participants try to guess the personality of the guy appeared on the photographs and only
the experimenter knows the real score. Since the knowledge-type questions are with true
answers and rooms of errors are allowed for the answer in a range, participants can raise
query on the genuineness of the feedback if they perceive their attempt is correct. We
therefore can mention to the students that comparing to the others, your performance is
better or worse than the mass of the class. As the statistics will not be disclosed to students,
they don’t know the true situation. This could elicit the over-placement and non8

overplacement.

We then examine if individual confidence can be changed or manipulated by an
external environment. The class participants are divided into two groups. A stimulus is
then created within the lab environment, and let it exert on each of two participant groups.
For the manipulation, the false expectation is implemented as well as the false feedback
methods for the manipulation (Ulkumen, Thomas and Morwitz 2012 and Anderson et al
2012). Students in each group were asked to answer both the general knowledge questions
as well as the task performance questions in order to measure their levels of selfconfidence (see Part 2 of Appendix B). On the false expectation method, participants in
the low (high) confidence condition were told that majority of the students who have
answered the questions before were very inaccurate (accurate) in answering the same
questions. Through the false feedback approach, those randomly assigned to the high (low)
confident group received overly positive (negative) feedback about their ability to answer
those questions. In our manipulation check, 12 items, adapted from Becker et al. (2016),
will be used to ascertain whether the manipulation is successful or not. The results from
the two classes of students are combined and t-tests performed to examine if the difference
in confidence level between the two groups is significant or not.

2.4 Experimental Results

The questionnaire provides both subjective general knowledge questions as well as
task performance questions. The false expectation and false feedback techniques are
adopted to attempt to either positively or negatively alter the confidence level in each
participant groups. The confidence level of the group that had been positively manipulated
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is shown in column 3 of Table 1 while the confidence level of the other group that had
been negatively manipulated are shown in column 5. Using a simple t-tests (column 7),
our experimental results show that the confidence level in the positive group is
significantly higher than the confidence level in the negative group. This is true using
either general knowledge questions or task performance questions, and under either
manipulation using the false expectation or the false feedback approach.

Our laboratory results show that the confidence level of the participants can indeed
be manipulated or changed (either lowered or raised). Individual confidence is therefore
found to be state-contingent after controlling for individual demographics and various
trait-based attributes. Our experiment shows that individual self-confidence can be
changed by an external stimulus, which is generally represented in our experiment by
using the false expectation and the false feedback techniques. In reality, people may feel
less confident when they face the downside. It also confirms with the rational expectation.
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3. EMPIRICAL SETTING
To measure the level of overconfidence, data using option-exercise behavior is
adopted.

3.1 Dependent Variable: Measure of Overconfidence

As a baseline, we measure managerial overconfidence by using CEOs’ options
exercise behavior (Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda 2015; Billet and Qian 2008;
Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh 2015; Malmendier and Tate 2005). We follow Hirshleifer, Low
and Teoh (2012) in calculating the average moneyness of the CEO’s option portfolio for
each year. First, for each CEO-year, we calculate the average realizable value per option
by dividing the total realizable value of the options by the number of options held by the
CEO. The strike price is calculated by subtracting the average realizable value from the
fiscal year end stock price. The average moneyness of the options is then calculated by
dividing the stock price and subtracting one from the result (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh
2012). As we are only interested in options that the CEO can exercise, we include only
the vested options held by the CEO. Overconfidence 67 is a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO
holds at least 67% in-the-money options.

Different level of managerial overconfidence is measured by the extent to which the
manager postpones the exercise of vested options. Hence, a continuous variable such as a
confidence index is constructed to explore if loan size, for instance, significantly changes
with the different level of overconfidence (for example, from overconfidence 67, the weak
form of overconfidence, to overconfidence 100, a strong form of confidence). Different
option-price measures of confidence will be constructed for robustness test.
11

Different option-price measures for indicating the level of managerial confidence
will be used for the robustness test. The dependent variables are represented by the
different levels of confidence. Various fixed effects, including the firm’s fixed effect and
CEO’s effect, are imposed.

Although the financial crisis is deemed to affect the prices of shares and options in
the stock market, it is found that a portion of the CEOs are still holding excessive options
and believing their companies would outperform the market. Therefore, option-based
measure is still a promising measure in the study.

To provide a more stringent testing of the state-contingent overconfidence hypothesis,
we examine whether or not the level of overconfidence changes among overconfident
group of CEOs and, correspondingly, if the level of non-overconfidence changes among
non-overconfident group of CEOs. We first separate the entire CEO sample into
overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. On the overconfidence sample, we then
construct different overconfidence levels (all of which above the 67% threshold) and
examine if GFC and SOX have significant effects on managerial overconfidence.
Similarly, on the non-overconfidence sample, we construct different non-overconfidence
level (all of which below the 67% threshold) and examine if it is significantly affected by
GFC and SOX.

Previous research examines the difference in the extent of loan defaults between
banks with overconfident CEOs and other banks (Ho et al 2016). There is a paucity of
research on how managerial overconfidence may affect the loan contract terms (see
12

Hollander and Verriest 2016 for a review). To explore the existence of state-contingent
overconfidence and to explore if the state-contingent overconfidence affects bank loan
term such as loan size (amount), we adopt the following equation for the regression. As
revealed by the previous literature, top managers can create value to the companies but
they may also cause troubles when building the empires. Loan amount can act as a variable
to test if overconfidence is adding value to the company in the viewpoint of the lender,
during external shocks. First, we would like to know whether the level of confidence
decreases with the occurrence of shocks. Second, we would like to know the effect of
overconfidence during shocks on the loan terms, especially the loan amounts.

Loan Size = f (Confidence level*GFC; firm controls; CEO characteristics; loan
characteristics; error term)

(2)

To detect the presence of state-contingent confidence, we use the interaction term as
indicated in equation 2. GFC as an exogenous shock is hypothesized to lower the level of
confidence of a manager, as what could happen in the interaction term, which then has the
effects of lowering default risk and hence the loan term imposed on the borrowers.
Similarly, in the case of a drastic change in the regulatory environment, SOX could have
lowered the level of confidence of a manager (state-contingent effect), which then raises
the loan size accordingly. A positive and significant coefficient of the (overconfidence
level * GFC) term reveals the additional effect overconfidence’s effect on loan amount
between the whole sample period and during the specified exogenous shocks (SOX and
Financial Crisis). A positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term
(overconfidence * external shock) implies that during the exogenous event, the firms with
overconfident CEO can obtain more loan amount. It is possible that the banks are aware
13

of the state-contingent confidence and adopt differential treatments to different managers.

We control for firm characteristics in our regressions, including firm size, profitability,
tangibility, market-to-book ratio, loan maturity, leverage, S&P rating, cash flow, and ZScore, following Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) and Kim, Li and Zhang (2011). Appendix A
provides the definitions and constructions of all the measured variables used in our
empirical analysis over the period 1995-2011.

To measure if the overconfidence level of overconfident CEOS changes, we use the
overconfident subsample and construct different overconfidence levels for the analysis.
This subsample test shows that given the possible trait-based nature of managerial
overconfidence, that is, even if an overconfident CEO remains overconfident over time,
the level of overconfidence could be changed by an exogenous shock. The results are
computed in the next section.

The literature convincingly showed that overconfident CEO is more risky than nonconfident CEO, as the former is more liable to overinvestments and over-engagement in
risky activities. Therefore, the expected hypothesis is that the average loan amounts
borrowers would receive from creditors are likely to increase with a decrease in the level
of overconfidence for any CEO/firm. To investigate if a GFC-induced change in the level
of overconfidence influences bank loan condition, loan amount is used as the dependent
variable and change in the level of overconfidence as the independent variable. The
analysis can be extended, for robustness tests, to other loan terms such as interest rate
charged on loans as well as the maturity term imposed on the loans.

14

3.2 Control Variables

CEO control variables

Similar to the previous literature, CEO and firm control variables are adopted. (Galasso
and Simcoe, 2011; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Hribar and
Yang, 2016; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). CEO Age is the age of the CEO at the
time of the observed year. CEO Tenure is the number of years that the managers taking up
the position in that firm. Male equals to 1 if the executive is male and zero if otherwise.
CEO Wealth is correlated to the option exercising behavior and the measure. CEO Wealth
is created following the approach suggested by Dittmann and Maug (2007) and retrieve
the data from the Execucomp Database starting from 1992. The CEO wealth is estimated
by summing up the stock holdings and the compensation received up to the observed year.
It is to estimate the saving of the executives.

Firm Control Variables

Based on the data retrieving from COMPUSTAT, firm control variables are therefore
constructed.

Firm size is the market value of the firm in the previous month prior the observed
month. Greater firm size would better reflect the value of the firm and thus less
information asymmetry (Graham et al. 2008).

15

Market-to-book is the market value of the firm as a portion of the book value of the
assets at the end of the financial year. It reveals the growth opportunities of the firm. Firms
with higher Market to Book ratio can get the loan and with a lower interest rate easier. The
drawback of higher market-to-book ratio is higher credit risk as the chance of financial
distress is also higher.

ROA (Profitability) is the firm’s net income as a ratio to the beginning amount of
assets of the financial year. This measures the firm’s ability to earn profit. Having a higher
value means a lower default risk and they will use equity financing (retained earning)
more often.

Tangibility is referring to the ratio of tangible assets to the amount of total assets.
The tangible assets are often the property, plant and equipment of the company. The
tangible assets serve as the firm’s collaterals when borrowing a debt. Having a greater
value means the firm is less risky and thus a lower borrowing cost is expected.

Leverage is a ratio measuring the amount of long-term debts to the total assets. It
measures the long-term solvency of the company. Having a high leverage means the firm
is likely to default and thus the borrowing cost would be higher if the firm succeed in
making a loan agreement.

Loan Characteristics

16

The loan related data are from DealScan. It is a database providing information on
many loan characteristics, for example, loan maturity and loan amount. For the detailed
features of the loan characteristics, refers to appendix A.

3.3 Empirical Results and Discussions

3.3.1 Direct Effects of GFC and SOX on Managerial Confidence

Evidence of state-contingent overconfidence can be obtained directly by observing
whether the self-confidence level of the managers can be changed by the advent of a
financial crisis or a financial regulation. Our empirical results using the data from more
than 4500 manager-years in different industries show that the managerial confidence
levels (ranging from under-confidence to overconfidence) are negatively and significantly
influenced by the GFC and by the SOX using OLS (Table 3). Our regressions control for
various demographic factors that may also correlate with self-confidence. The coefficients
remain significant after controlling for the CEO, the firm as well as the fixed effects using
Generalized Least Square in Table 4.

By subsample analysis, it is shown that the overconfidence level of the overconfident
managers is significantly changed by the exogenous shocks. Previous studies often
compared the differences in the behavioral effects between overconfident and nonoverconfident managers, but in this paper, we provide the state-contingent evidences that
the overconfidence level of the overconfident managers and conversely, the nonoverconfidence level of the non-overconfident managers, could be significantly changed
by exogenous shocks.
17

3.3.2 External Shocks

We conduct natural experiments using real-life data to investigate (a) if managerial
confidence level interacts with (or impacts by) an exogenous shock such as GFC or SOX
and (b) if the interaction terms have any significant effects on a loan credit term. The
results on SOX are reported in Table 5 and those on GFC are presented in Table 5. The
overconfidence coefficient may not be significant as most of the observations are from
year 2002 and thereafter. The coefficient of the interaction terms (confidence level * SOX)
are reported to be positive and highly significant (see Table 5). This implies that the
overconfidence during exogenous shock significantly raised the loan amounts offered to
them by the creditors. Previous studies posit that the decision-making power of CEOs
could be assuaged or substituted by the appointments of independent directors or auditors.
This paper provides an evidence that CEOs’ confidence level and hence their investment
risk appetite were dampened by the external shock. It is unconceivable for a top executive
to lose his decision-making power so easily.

In the case of GFC, similar results are obtained (see Table 6). The interaction terms
(confidence level * GFC) are reported to be positive and highly significant, implying that
the exogenous shock has lowered the confidence level of the managers, as found in the
Table 3 and 4, which then significantly raised the loan principal amounts provided by the
creditors (implied by the positive and significant coefficient of interaction term). The
results are consistent with the literature that loan default risk level decreases with the
decline in managerial self-confidence level. There are less overconfidence managers
during external shock and the leftover managers are believed to be value-adding officers
18

to the companies that they would carry out profitable projects. Creditors therefore raised
the loan size in response to the financial crisis (which alleviated the risk levels of the
managers).

3.3.3 Subsample Analysis: Change in Overconfidence Level for an Overconfident CEO

A large volume of the finance literature compared the behavioral effects of
overconfident managers versus non-overconfident managers and found that overconfident
managers take more risk than the other. The change in the confidence and the risk level of
the managers have been assumed to be stable in each group. In this section, we test if
managerial overconfidence level of the overconfident CEOs is significantly changed by
an economic shock. Similar results are obtained by using the data comprising of only
overconfident CEOs (see Table 7 in the case of SOX and Table 8 in the case of GFC),
pointing to the robustness our empirical results that the overconfidence level of the
overconfident managers are significantly affected by the exogenous shocks.

The analysis on the underconfident sample is also done and find that the
underconfident level of the underconfident managers could also be significantly changed
by the GFC and the SOX, which then exerted significant impacts on the loan amounts.
Similar results are obtained using other loan terms such as loan maturity and loan spread
(interest rate charged on loans) as the dependent variables.
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4. Conclusions and Implications

Previous studies assumed that overconfidence is a character trait that is stable over
time. Consequently, most research in the finance literature compared the differences in the
behavioral effects between overconfident and non-overconfident types of managers and
found for instance, that overconfident managers overinvest and engage in more risky
activities than the underconfident counterpart. Creditors should therefore impose more
stringent loan terms on overconfident managers. This paper, however, provides a first
attempt to show that managerial overconfidence can be state-contingent, that is, the level
of overconfidence among overconfident managers could be influenced by external shocks.
Hence, instead of comparing the behavioral effects between overconfident and nonoverconfident managers, we examine how the overconfidence and the default risk level of
the overconfident managers could be changed by exogenous shocks. Our experimental
and empirical analyses show that self-confidence level of an individual and
overconfidence level of an overconfident manager can indeed be state-contingent. The
importance of this new result is shown by applying the state-contingent overconfidence
hypothesis to finance.

Our paper implies that since overconfidence is state-contingent, creditors should
review the loan credit terms whenever an external shock slashes the financial market. The
loan size is used as an example of a loan credit term creditors use to defray their loan
default risk. In the presence of a crisis, creditors would naturally reduce the loan amount
in order to alleviate the negative impact of a systemic default risk. This paper, however,
shows that creditors may join hands with the CEOs that the loan amounts increases for the
remaining overconfidence managers. With regards to the declining economy, loans would
20

still be possible to be lent to the overconfidence CEOs and they are believed to create
better value for the companies than the non-overconfident counterparts.
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Table 1 Experimental Evidence: T-test Results between High and Low Confidence Groups

Subjective general
knowledge level
False
Expectation Subjective task
performance

False
Feedback

High-Confidence
Group (n = 41)
Mean
SD
58.0
16.1

Low-Confidence
Group (n = 41)
Mean
SD
46.5
19.8

t-test
-1.94^

59.5

15.5

46.5

19.2

-2.27*

Subjective general
knowledge level

55.8

17.0

36.3

21.2

-3.10**

Subjective task
performance

58.5

14.3

35.9

20.3

3.93***

Subjective general
knowledge level

56.9

16.1

41.4

18.1

-2.75**

Subjective task
performance

59.0

14.3

41.2

17.4

-3.40**

Overall

This table provides evidence of state-contingent overconfidence from the laboratory
experiments. False expectation and false feedback methods (from psychology literature) were
used to test whether or not individual’s self-confidence level can be changed. *p<.05. **p<.01.
***p<.001
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Table 2 Empirical Analysis: Summary Statistics
See Appendix A for the detailed variable definitions

Variable

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Overconfidence Measures
Overconfidence 67
Overconfidence Index
Average Option Price

6045
6045
6044

.2967742
.9680728
.2663608

.4568739
1.185538
.2641887

0
0
0

1
3
4.154439

Loan Characteristics
Ln(loan amount)
Ln(Maturity)
Secured

6043
5745
6045

19.56283
3.593328
.262531

1.224556
.6986203
.440046

13.99783
.6931472
0

24.12446
5.484797
1

Firm Characteristics
Ln(Asset)
Market-to-book
Profitability
Tangibility
Z-score
Ln(Firm age)
Cash flow vol

6045
6045
6044
6045
5776
6045
5614

7.882641
1.850499
.1468398
.3388973
2.618075
3.251725
63.2186

1.497603
1.036431
.0756185
.2284383
2.553105
.6949042
136.4043

4.611431
.7120423
-.0818947
.0171859
-.8035191
.6931472
.6073399

12.39703
7.170837
.4362031
.8953143
17.5571
4.110874
1502.4
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Table 3 Effects of GFC and SOX on Managerial Overconfidence

Financial Crisis

(1)
Overconfidence
Index
-0.105**
(-2.52)

(2)
Avg Option Price
-0.0309***
(-3.34)

(3)
Overconfidence
67
-0.0376**
(-2.27)

(4)
Overconfidence
Index

(5)
Avg Option Price

(6)
Overconfidence
67

-0.138***
-0.0279***
-0.0562***
(-4.02)
(-3.69)
(-4.15)
Ln(CEO age)
-0.190
-0.0430
-0.0855*
-0.210
-0.0457
-0.0942*
(-1.47)
(-1.50)
(-1.67)
(-1.62)
(-1.60)
(-1.84)
Ln(tenure)
0.125***
0.0260***
0.0464***
0.120***
0.0252***
0.0442***
(6.66)
(6.28)
(6.23)
(6.37)
(6.05)
(5.92)
Male
0.312***
0.0674**
0.0857*
0.303**
0.0662**
0.0815*
(2.61)
(2.55)
(1.81)
(2.53)
(2.50)
(1.72)
Ln(Wealth)
0.0432**
0.00983**
0.0128*
0.0622***
0.0130***
0.0210***
(2.23)
(2.29)
(1.67)
(3.07)
(2.90)
(2.61)
***
**
***
***
***
Firm Size
-0.0485
-0.00702
-0.0199
-0.0541
-0.00799
-0.0223***
(-3.65)
(-2.39)
(-3.78)
(-4.05)
(-2.70)
(-4.20)
***
***
***
***
***
Market to book
0.988
0.222
0.335
0.983
0.222
0.333***
(28.27)
(28.76)
(24.17)
(28.17)
(28.77)
(24.03)
***
***
***
***
***
Lagged Cash Flow
0.0585
0.0146
0.0197
0.0567
0.0140
0.0191***
(3.70)
(4.18)
(3.14)
(3.60)
(4.02)
(3.06)
*
Constant
0.681
0.178
0.342
0.720
0.183
0.359*
(1.32)
(1.56)
(1.67)
(1.39)
(1.60)
(1.75)
N
5351
5350
5351
5351
5350
5351
R2
0.1812
0.1850
0.1412
0.1827
0.1854
0.1431
This table contains the OLS results using overconfidence levels spanning from under-confidence (option price threshold below 67%) to
overconfidence (option price threshold above 67%) as the dependent variables and the external shocks (GFC and SOX) as the
independent variables. State-contingent self-confidence is evidenced by the direct effect of GFC and SOX on managerial self-confidence.
t statistics are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
SOX
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Table 4 Effects of GFC and SOX on Managerial Overconfidence

Financial Crisis

(1)
Overconfidence
Index
-0.148***
(-2.59)
-0.207
(-1.60)
0.118***
(6.32)
0.284**
(2.39)
0.0635***
(3.17)
-0.0543***
(-4.08)
0.950***
(26.97)
0.0609***
(3.86)

(2)
Avg Option Price
-0.0384***
(-3.34)
-0.0451
(-1.58)
0.0250***
(6.02)
0.0622**
(2.36)
0.0132***
(3.01)
-0.00795***
(-2.70)
0.215***
(27.65)
0.0152***
(4.35)

(3)
Overconfidence
67
-0.0497**
(-2.36)
-0.0911*
(-1.78)
0.0445***
(5.98)
0.0778
(1.64)
0.0190**
(2.39)
-0.0217***
(-4.10)
0.325***
(23.22)
0.0202***
(3.22)

(4)
Overconfidence
Index

(5)
Avg Option Price

(6)
Overconfidence
67

-0.218*
-0.0470*
-0.0962*
(-1.69)
(-1.65)
(-1.88)
Ln(tenure)
0.115***
0.0243***
0.0431***
(6.15)
(5.86)
(5.78)
**
**
Male
0.277
0.0608
0.0756
(2.33)
(2.31)
(1.60)
***
***
Ln(wealth)
0.0751
0.0157
0.0239***
(3.67)
(3.47)
(2.94)
***
***
Firm Size
-0.0577
-0.00867
-0.0232***
(-4.32)
(-2.94)
(-4.36)
***
***
Market to Book
0.943
0.214
0.324***
(26.79)
(27.51)
(23.17)
Lagged Cash Flow
0.0602***
0.0149***
0.0197***
(3.83)
(4.28)
(3.15)
SOX
-0.158***
-0.0319***
-0.0612***
(-3.10)
(-3.14)
(-3.51)
Constant
0.659
0.172
0.337*
0.713
0.180
0.360*
(1.28)
(1.51)
(1.65)
(1.38)
(1.57)
(1.76)
N
5335
5334
5335
5335
5334
5335
2
R
0.1774
0.1814
0.1391
0.1794
0.1821
0.1414
This table contains the random effects GLS results using overconfidence levels spanning from under-confidence (option price threshold
below 67%) to overconfidence (option price threshold above 67%) as the dependent variables and the external shocks (GFC and SOX)
as the independent variables. State-contingent self-confidence is evidenced by the direct effect of GFC and SOX on managerial selfconfidence. t statistics are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Ln(CEO age)
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Table 5 Effects of SOX-Confidence Interaction on Loan Amounts
Variables
Overconfidence 67
Overconfidence 67*SOX

(1)
Ln (loan amount)
0.0280
(0.67)
0.170***
(3.50)

Avg Option Price

(2)
Ln (loan amount)

0.0888
(1.27)
0.232***
(2.82)

Avg Option Price*SOX
Overconfidence Index
Overconfidence Index*SOX
SOX
Firm Size
Leverage
Profitability
Tangibility
Z_score
Ln(loan maturity)
Constant
N
R2

(3)
Ln (loan amount)

-0.0644**
(-2.28)
0.642***
(89.86)
0.509***
(7.00)
1.566***
(10.68)
-0.426***
(-9.08)
-0.0218***
(-4.24)
0.257***
(16.98)
13.46***
(149.09)
5588
0.6236

-0.0751**
(-2.30)
0.640***
(89.57)
0.507***
(6.96)
1.548***
(10.52)
-0.420***
(-8.96)
-0.0224***
(-4.31)
0.257***
(16.98)
13.46***
(148.23)
5587
0.6228

0.0177
(1.12)
0.0653***
(3.52)
-0.0763**
(-2.53)
0.642***
(89.88)
0.505***
(6.96)
1.539***
(10.48)
-0.422***
(-9.01)
-0.0230***
(-4.45)
0.255***
(16.88)
13.47***
(148.97)
5588
0.6242

This table contains the results of OLS regressions with fixed effects between loan amount as the
dependent variables and the interactions of SOX and Self-confidence as the independent variables.
The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is expressed in natural log of the loan amount. The
interaction terms provide evidences of potential changes in managerial confidence levels brought
by the external shock. Numbers in parenthesis are standard error. *, ** and *** denote significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

30

Table 6. Effects of GFC-Overconfidence Interaction on Loan Amounts
Variables
Overconfidence 67
Overconfidence 67*Fin Crisis

(1)
Ln (Loan amount)
0.130***
(5.21)
0.144**
(2.25)

(2)
Ln (Loan amount)

0.206***
(4.73)
0.291***
(2.78)

Avg Option Price
Avg Option Price*Fin Crisis
Overconfidence Index
Overconfidence Index*Fin Crisis
Fin Crisis
Firm Size
Leverage
Profitability
Tangibility
Z_score
Ln(loan maturity)
Constant
N
R2

(3)
Ln (Loan amount)

-0.0126
(-0.39)
0.639***
(90.56)
0.516***
(7.16)
1.560***
(10.63)
-0.419***
(-8.95)
-0.0224***
(-4.38)
0.253***
(17.05)
13.45***
(148.99)
5588
0.6231

-0.0433
(-1.16)
0.637***
(90.39)
0.512***
(7.10)
1.546***
(10.52)
-0.416***
(-8.89)
-0.0228***
(-4.42)
0.253***
(17.06)
13.45***
(148.80)
5587
0.6228

0.0561***
(5.77)
0.0531**
(2.21)
-0.0202
(-0.58)
0.639***
(90.61)
0.511***
(7.10)
1.533***
(10.44)
-0.415***
(-8.89)
-0.0237***
(-4.61)
0.252***
(16.98)
13.45***
(149.06)
5588
0.6237

This table contains the results of OLS regressions with fixed effects between loan amount as the
dependent variable and the interactions of GFC and CEO’s self-confidence as the independent
variables. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is expressed in natural log of the loan
amount. The interaction terms provide evidences of potential changes in managerial selfconfidence levels brought by the external shock. Numbers in parenthesis are standard error. *, **
& *** denote significance at 1%, 5% & 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7 Overconfidence Subsample: Effects of SOX-Overconfidence Interactions on Loan
Amounts
Variables
Overconfidence 67
Overconfidence 67*SOX

(1)
Ln (loan amount)
-0.0174
(-0.38)
0.146***
(2.71)

Avg Option Price

(2)
Ln (loan amount)

0.0423
(0.66)
0.132*
(1.65)

Avg Option Price*SOX
Overconfidence Index
Overconfidence Index*SOX
SOX
Firm Size
Leverage
Profitability
Tangibility
Z_score
Ln (loan maturity)
Constant
N
R2

(3)
Ln (loan amount)

-0.0595*
(-1.79)
0.660***
(81.16)
0.264***
(3.59)
1.383***
(8.53)
-0.313***
(-6.14)
-0.0302***
(-6.02)
0.270***
(15.78)
13.31***
(127.92)
4134
0.6465

-0.0477
(-1.31)
0.658***
(80.94)
0.256***
(3.43)
1.394***
(8.40)
-0.310***
(-6.06)
-0.0314***
(-5.85)
0.270***
(15.81)
13.30***
(126.60)
4132
0.6446

0.00688
(0.39)
0.0477**
(2.32)
-0.0601*
(-1.68)
0.659***
(81.18)
0.263***
(3.59)
1.360***
(8.37)
-0.312***
(-6.13)
-0.0312***
(-6.20)
0.268***
(15.66)
13.31***
(127.50)
4134
0.6468

This table contains the results of OLS regressions with fixed effects between loan amount as
the dependent variables and the interactions of SOX and CEO overconfidence as the
independent variables. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is expressed in natural
log of the loan amount. The results provide evidences on the change in managerial
overconfidence among the overconfident CEOs only. Numbers in parenthesis are standard
error. *, ** & *** denote significance at 1%, 5% & 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8 Overconfidence Subsample: Effects of GFC-Overconfidence Interactions on Loan
Amounts

Overconfidence
Overconfidence*GFC

(1)
Ln (loan amount)
0.113***
(4.37)
0.143**
(2.31)

(2)
Ln (loan amount)

(3)
Ln (loan amount)

0.190***
(4.07)
0.243**
(2.39)

Avg Option Price
Avg Option Price*GFC

0.0510***
(4.97)
Overconfidence Index*GFC
0.0460**
(1.97)
GFC
0.0134
-0.00753
0.0112
(0.41)
(-0.20)
(0.32)
Firm Size
0.648***
0.647***
0.648***
(80.52)
(80.47)
(80.61)
Leverage
0.370***
0.368***
0.368***
(4.62)
(4.58)
(4.59)
Profitability
1.613***
1.588***
1.586***
(9.55)
(9.38)
(9.38)
Tangibility
-0.341***
-0.335***
-0.339***
(-7.04)
(-6.92)
(-7.00)
Z_score
-0.0215***
-0.0213***
-0.0226***
(-3.89)
(-3.81)
(-4.08)
***
***
Ln (loan maturity)
0.434
0.433
0.432***
(15.11)
(15.05)
(15.05)
***
***
Constant
12.04
12.04
12.04***
(79.54)
(79.39)
(79.56)
N
4346
4345
4346
R2
0.6745
0.6743
0.6749
This table contains the results of OLS regressions with fixed effects between loan amounts as
Overconfidence Index

the dependent variables and the interactions between GFC and CEO overconfidence as the
independent variables. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is expressed in natural log
of the loan amount. The results provide evidence of the change in managerial overconfidence
level among the overconfident CEO sample only. Numbers in parenthesis are standard error. *,
** & *** denote significance at 1%, 5% & 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix A Variables and Definitions
Variable

Definition

Overconfidence Measures
Overconfidence 67

Option-based measure of CEO overconfidence. A dummy
variable equals to 1 if the average moneyness of CEO's option
portfolio is larger than 67%, zero otherwise. Average moneyness
is calculated as the value of vested option divided by the average
strike price of the option

Overconfidence Index

Option-based measure of CEO overconfidence. The index equals
to 0 if the average moneyness of CEO’s option portfolio is below
0.3, equals to 1 if the average moneyness of CEO's option
portfolio lies between 0.3 and 0.67; equals to 2 if the average
moneyness of CEO's option portfolio lies between 0.67 and 1; and
equals to 3 if the average moneyness of CEO's option portfolio is
larger 1

Average Option Price

Option-based measure of CEO overconfidence equals to the value
per option of in-the-money option by dividing the unexercised
exercisable option by number of options. The value per option is
scaled by the stock price in fiscal year end

Loan Characteristics Variables
Ln(Loan amount)
Ln(Maturity)
Secured
Loan purpose
Loan types

Natural log of loan amount (in US$)
Natural log of loan maturity (in months)
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan is secured
Dummy variables, which includes acquisition corporate purpose,
debt repayment, takeover, etc.
Dummy variables, which includes term loan, revolver, bridging
loan, etc.

Firm Characteristics
Ln(Asset)

Natural log of the firm’s total assets (Compustat: "AT")

Leverage

Firm’s leverage is defined as (long-term debts + short-term
debts)/total asset. (Compustat: (DLTT+DLC)/AT)

Market-to-book ratio

Firm's market-to-book ratio. (Compustat: (CSHO*PRCC_F + AT
- CEQ)/AT)

Profitability

Firm's profitability is defined as operating income before
depreciation / total asset. (Compustat: OIBDP/AT)

Tangibility

The firm’s tangibility, defined as net property, plant and
equipment/total assets. (Compustat: PPENT/AT)
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Z-score

The firm's Z-score. (Compustat: 3.3*PI/AT + SALE/AT +
1.4*RE/AT
+
1.2*(ACT
LCT)/ATQ
+
0.6*(CSHO*PRCC_F)/LT) (see Murfin [2012])

S&P rating

Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has an S&P rating, zero
otherwise.

Ln(Firm age)

Natural log of the firm’s age

Cash flow vol

Cashflow volatility is defined as the standard deviation of
quarterly operating cash flow over 36 quarters. (Compustat:
OIBDPQ – TXTQ – XINTQ)

External Exogenous Shocks
GFC

Over the period, we define 2007-2008 as crisis year and others
as non-crisis years. The dummy equals to 1 if it is a crisis year,
zero otherwise.

SOX

The Sarbanes Oxley Act dummy equals to 1 if the loan was
made in 2002 or later, zero otherwise.
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Appendix B Laboratory Experiment Questionnaires
Part 1 Personality Traits
a. Measure of dispositional optimism Life Orientation Test-Revised (Scheier et al., 1994)

For each of the following statement, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree
with the statement (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). There are no "correct" or
"incorrect" answers. Answer according to your own feelings. Please be honest.
Strongly
disagree
1

2

3

Neither agree
nor disagree
4
5

6

Strongly
agree
7

1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. It's easy for me to relax.
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will. (R)
4. I'm always optimistic about my future.
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.
6. It's important for me to keep busy.
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. (R)
8. I don't get upset too easily.
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. (R)
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
b. Trait Narcissism (Macenczak et al., 2016; Cambell et al., 2004), level
In each of the following pairs of attributes, choose the one that you MOST AGREE with. Mark your
answer by writing EITHER A or B in the space provided. Only mark 1 ANSWER for each attitude pair.
1. A I find it easy to manipulate people.
B I don’t like it when I find myself manipulating people.
2.

A When people compliment me I get embarrassed.
B I know that I am a good person because everybody keeps telling me so.

3.

A I like having authority over other people.
B I don’t mind following orders.

4.

A I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.
B I usually get the respect I deserve.

5.

A I don’t particularly like to show off my body.
B I like to show off my body.

6.

A I have a strong will to power.
B Power for its own sake doesn’t interest me.

7.

A I expect a great deal from other people.
B I like to do things for other people.

8.

A My body is nothing special.
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B I like to look at my body.
9.

A Being in authority doesn’t mean much to me.
B People always seem to recognize my authority.

10. A I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.
B I will take my satisfactions as they come.
11. A I try not to be a show off.
B I will usually show off if I get the chance.
12. A I am a born leader.
B Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop.
13. A I like to look at myself in the mirror.
B I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.
c. The Economic Locus of Control Scale (Furnham, 1986; Human Relations)
Answers are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale.
13 items used by Salamanca et al., 2016
Saving and careful investing is a key factor in becoming rich.
Whether or not I become wealthy depends mostly on my ability.
There is little one can do to prevent poverty.
In the long run, people who take care of their finances stay wealthy.
Becoming rich has nothing to do with luck.
Regarding money, there isn’t much you can do for yourself when you are poor.
It’s not always wise for me to save because many things turn out to be a matter of good
fortune or bad fortune.
If I become poor, it is usually my own fault.
I am usually able to protect my personal interests.
When I get what I want, it is usually because I worked hard for it.
My life is determined by my own actions.
It is chiefly a matter of fate whether I become rich or poor.
Only those who inherit or win money can possibly become rich.
d. Mood (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. Indicate to what
extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment OR indicate the extent
you have felt this way over the past week (circle the instructions you followed when taking
this measure)
1
Not at All

2
A Little

3
Moderately

__________ 1. Interested __________
__________2. Distressed __________
__________3. Excited __________
__________4. Upset __________

4
Quite a bit

11. Irritable
12. Alert
13. Ashamed
14. Inspired
37

5
Extremely

__________5. Strong __________
__________6. Guilty __________
__________7. Scared __________
__________8. Hostile __________
__________9. Enthusiastic __________
__________10. Proud __________

15. Nervous
16. Determined
17. Attentive
18. Jittery
19. Active
20. Afraid

e. Future orientation/Time perspective
Read each item and, as honestly as you can, answer the question: ‘How characteristic
or true is this of me?’ Check the appropriate answer according to the scale below.
1
Very Untrue

2
Untrue

3
Neutral

4
True

5
Very True

Please answer all the following questions:
1. I think about the bad things that have happened to me in the past
2. Painful past experiences keep being replayed in my mind
3. It’s hard for me to forget unpleasant images of my youth
4. Familiar childhood sights, sounds, smells bring back a flood of wonderful memories
5. Happy memories of good times spring readily to mind
6. I enjoy stories about how things used to be in the ‘good old times’
7. Life today is too complicated; I would prefer the simpler life of the past
8. Since whatever will be will be, it doesn’t really matter what I do
9. Often luck pays off better than hard work
10. I make decisions on the spur of the moment
11. Taking risks keeps my life from becoming boring
12. It is important to put excitement in my life
13. When I want to achieve something, I set goals for reaching those goals
14. Meeting tomorrow’s deadlines and doing other work comes before tonight’s play
15. I complete projects on time by making steady progress
f. Delay Discounting (Monetary Choice)
For each of the next 27 choices, please indicate which reward you would prefer: the smaller
reward today, or the larger reward in the specified number of days.
1. Would you prefer HK$432 today, or HK$440 in 117 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
2. Would you prefer HK$440 today, or HK$600 in 61 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
3. Would you prefer HK$152 today, or HK$200 in 53 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
4. Would you prefer HK$248 today, or HK$680 in 7 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
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[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
5. Would you prefer HK$112 today, or HK$200 in 19 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
6. Would you prefer HK$376 today, or HK$400 in 160 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
7. Would you prefer HK$120 today, or HK$280 in 13 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
8. Would you prefer HK$200 today, or HK$480 in 14 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
9. Would you prefer HK$624 today, or HK$640 in 162 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
10. Would you prefer HK$320 today, or HK$440 in 62 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
11. Would you prefer HK$88 today, or HK$240 in 7 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
12. Would you prefer HK$536 today, or HK$600 in 119 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
13. Would you prefer HK$272 today, or HK$280 in 186 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
14. Would you prefer HK$216 today, or HK$400 in 21 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
15. Would you prefer HK$552 today, or HK$680 in 91 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
16. Would you prefer HK$392 today, or HK$480 in 89 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
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17. Would you prefer HK$640 today, or HK$680 in 157 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
18. Would you prefer HK$192 today, or HK$280 in 29 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
19. Would you prefer HK$264 today, or HK$640 in 14 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
20. Would you prefer HK$224 today, or HK$240 in 179 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
21. Would you prefer HK$272 today, or HK$400 in 30 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
22. Would you prefer HK$200 today, or HK$240 in 80 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
23. Would you prefer HK$328 today, or HK$600 in 20 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
24. Would you prefer HK$432 today, or HK$480 in 111 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
25. Would you prefer HK$432 today, or HK$640 in 30 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
26. Would you prefer HK$176 today, or HK$200 in 136 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
27. Would you prefer HK$160 today, or HK$440 in 7 days?
[ ] smaller reward today
[ ] larger reward in the specified number of days
Part 2 Overconfidence Manipulation
Below you will see 10 of the general knowledge items. Please estimate the answer for each
item. You will need to provide lower bound and upper bound estimation for each item.
For example: what is the population for the city Berlin?
If you estimate that the city Berlin has between 2m and 5m, then you write your answers:
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Lower bound: 2,000,000
Upper bound: 5,000,000
Now please based on your own estimation and answer the following questions
Low confidence condition:
These general knowledge questions were presented to Lingnan students before, results
show that the vast majority of students who have done this task were very inaccurate in
estimating the answers (i.e. they could not answer the question correctly)
High confidence condition:
These general knowledge questions were presented to Lingnan students before, results
show that the vast majority of students who have done this task were very accurate in
estimating the answers (i.e. they could answer the question correctly)
(Do NOT use the Internet to search for the answers and Do NOT discuss the questions or
answers with your classmates).
Interval Production Task (State) (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992, Sloan management review)
Scale: (Used by Langnickel & Zeisberger, 2016; Hilton et al., 2011 Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making; Biais et al., 2005 The Review of Economic Studies)
(1) Martin Luther King’s age at death (please estimate in terms of years)
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
a. How confident (from 10% to 100%) are you that the real answer would lie within your
estimated ranges? If you think you have 90% confidence that your estimated answer is
close to the real answer, please choose 90% confidence level
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
b. How difficult did you find the question?
Very easy
1
2
3
4

5

6

Very difficult
7

c. How do you compare your general knowledge level with other students in ECO3208?
Please rate on a scale from 1 (I am at the very bottom; worse than 99% of the student in this
study) to 100 (I am at the very top; better than 99% of the people in this study)
d. How do you compare your task scores with other students in ECO3208?
Please rate on a scale from 1 (I am at the very bottom; worse than 99% of the student in this
study) to 100 (I am at the very top; better than 99% of the people in this study)
(2) Length of the Nile River (please estimate in terms of kilometers)
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
(3) Number of countries that are members of OPEC
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
(4) Number of books in the Old Testament
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
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(5) Weight of an empty Boeing 747 (please estimate in terms of kg)
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
Low confidence condition:
Unfortunately, comparing with other students in ECO3208, your performance in the
last 5 questions is WORSE than 77% of the students. Please continue WITHOUT
looking up on the internet for answers.
High confidence condition:
Congratulation! Comparing with other students in ECO3208, your performance in the
last 5 questions is BETTER than 77% of the students. Please continue WITHOUT
looking up on the internet for answers.
(6) Year in which the composer Johann Sebastian Bach was born
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
(7) Average gestation period of an elephant (please estimate in terms of month)
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
(8) Diameter of the moon (please estimate in terms of kilometer)
Lower Bound: ________________ Upper Bound: ________________
(9) Air distance from London to Tokyo (please estimate in terms of kilometer)
Lower Bound:
Upper Bound:
(10) Deepest known point in the oceans (please estimate in terms of kilometers)
Lower Bound:
Upper Bound:
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